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William Hazlitt published “On Public Opinion” in 1828, during what is now known 
as the Romantic period. The Romantic period was also influenced by the French Revolution 
(1789) and the Scottish Enlightenment. The turbulent years following the French 
Revolution (1789), created political writing, which questioned tyranny, religion, and the 
role of the monarchy, among others. Francis Hutcheson’s An Essay on the Nature and 
Conduct of the Passions and Affections with Illustrations upon the Moral Sense (1728) heavily 
shaped the Scottish Enlightenment. The Scottish Enlightenment also fostered writing which 
examined intellectual reasoning and sentiments or feelings as well as human nature and 
how humans interact and relate with one another, especially in terms of morality and God. 
As a pre-Romantic writer, Adam Smith’s The Theory of Moral Sentiments (1759) 
significantly impacted the Romantic period. In The Theory of Moral Sentiments (1759), 
Smith discusses “sympathetic identification,” or the role of one’s imagination in creating 
fellow feelings between individuals. Hazlitt himself was an influential Romantic writer and 
his essays were essential in shaping work that came later in the period.  
William Hazlitt discusses the tendency of friends and the public to distance 
themselves when one became the subject of gossip in nineteenth-century England in “On 
Public Opinion.” Hazlitt also analyzes how gossip was labeled and spread with an 
endorsement of truth, even though some privately disagreed. He describes a disconcerting 
public where many only accepted information that confirmed their beliefs and dismissed 
any that did not, despite tangible proof. The public was also motivated and silenced by fear 
since once uttered, rumors were uncontrollable and could shift their focus suddenly and 
unpredictably to another person. Hazlitt expresses disappointment that friends were only 
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willing to remain loyal until their own reputations were in danger of being dragged down 
through association with the rumor tainted person. Hazlitt is not only critical of the public, 
but is actually judgmental with his disdain and calls for the entire public to be held 
accountable for the circulation of misinformation. Even those whom he views as silenced 
by the threat of ostracism were not absolved from blame—they helped perpetuate their 
position by remaining silent since imposing silence on others was not natural, but also 
allowing silence to be imposed was not natural either. Both the imagery and words he uses 
depict the environment as illogical. By portraying nineteenth-century English society as 
unnatural and immoral, he provokes readers to question the definition of human nature 
and morality as was done during the Scottish Enlightenment. Similar to Smith’s The Theory 
of Moral Sentiments (1759), in William Hazlitt’s An Essay on the Principals of Human Action: 
Being an Argument in Favor of the Natural Disinterestedness of the Human Mind (1805), he 
discusses the role of sympathy and the imagination. However, unlike in The Theory of Moral 
Sentiments (1759), Hazlitt is particularly interested in the role of the imagination when 
identifying with one’s future self. While Smith examines consequences for behaving 
improperly in The Theory of Moral Sentiments (1759), in “On Public Opinion,” (1828) 
Hazlitt depicts a forced conformity from the threat of overly harsh punishments for 
misbehavior in nineteenth century-English society—such as ostracization. I propose that 
William Hazlitt’s argument in “On Public Opinion” (1828) demonstrates the silencing effect 
of nineteenth-century English society when misinformation was able to circulate. The work 
also demonstrates the threat of ostracism from questioning or challenging false beliefs 
stemmed from the inability to tolerate uncertainty. These factors in unison produced a 
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public that Hazlitt asserts was illogical and counter to human nature, as well as 
manipulated by those in power to maintain that power.  
As a political writer, Hazlitt wrote about public opinion in essays throughout his 
career—some examples of which are: “What is the People?” (1817), “On the Pleasure of 
Hating” (1821), and “On Court Influence” (1818). Claire Brock states in “William Hazlitt, on 
Being Brilliant” (2005) that, “William Hazlitt…was obsessed throughout his career with the 
politics of public opinion” (499). However, while some of Hazlitt’s political essays 
discussing public opinion have garnered attention from scholars and are somewhat 
discussed in scholarly articles, “On Public Opinion” (1828) has only been occasionally and 
briefly mentioned. It has primarily been used to reference a personal scandal of Hazlitt’s 
involving Mr. Blackwood’s magazine, which published an article in 1818 containing false 
and defamatory information about Hazlitt (William Hazlitt Selected Writings 385). Kevin 
Gilmartin in William Hazlitt: Political Essayist (2015) notes this as well and claims that, 
“there is a persistent tendency to devalue his [Hazlitt’s] political prose by comparison with 
his writing on literature, theater, and metaphysics” (1). Yet, despite acknowledging that 
Hazlitt’s political writing is frequently overlooked, Gilmartin also fails to mention “On 
Public Opinion” (1828) as more than a reference to Mr. Blackwood’s Magazine—further 
illustrating why this thesis’ focus on it is necessary (Gilmartin 213). As the victim of scandal 
and rumor throughout his life, “On Public Opinion” (1828) is both a political essay, and an 
expression of anger derived from his personal experience and observation.  
“On Public Opinion” (1828) exhibits a pronounced change in Hazlitt’s writing and 
views on public opinion. Previously, while he had still been critical of the public, his writing 
had also been more hopeful for the possibility of societal changes (William Hazlitt Selected 
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Writings 3). John Cook, the editor of William Hazlitt Selected Writings, notes that, “On Public 
Opinion” “presents a marked contrast to the account of public opinion Hazlitt had given in 
his writings on the French Revolution” (384). As an essay published about two years before 
his death, “On Public Opinion” is an accumulation of his life experiences and insights, which 
Hazlitt claims change over time. In “On Consistency of Opinion” (1821) Hazlitt writes that, 
“I remember once saying to…[a] gentleman, a great while ago, that I did not seem to have 
altered any of my ideas since I was sixteen years old. ‘Why then,’ said he, ‘you are no wiser 
now than you were then!’ I might make the same confession, and the same retort would 
apply still” (William Hazlitt Selected Writings 30). Given that the essay was published at a 
later date than many which have been more closely studied and given that he maintained 
the belief that insights develop and vary over the course of one’s life, “On Public Opinion” is 
a more complete synthesis of his life experiences, and therefore also a more complete 
synthesis of his beliefs than earlier writing. This is not to discount his earlier political 
writing, as much can be gleamed from his insights both earlier and later on in life.  
Hazlitt attempted to avoid aligning himself with a particular political party, and 
instead took a stance against tyranny, which explains why he critiques the entire 
nineteenth-century English social environment in “On Public Opinion” (1828) as opposed 
to a single political party. Gilmartin quotes Hazlitt’s claim that, “‘I am no politician, and still 
less can I be said to be a party-man: but I have a hatred of tyranny, and a contempt for its 
tools; and this feeling I have expressed as often and as strongly as I could’” (95). In the 
essay, Hazlitt is against the silencing of truth, by a majority or by fear. Also, he views 
political division as fueling tyranny as opposed to fighting it, again supporting why he 
would criticize the entire environment as opposed to one point of view (89). Hazlitt views 
 6 
 
all members of the public as contributing to the social environment and subsequently 





Section I: The Groups Within the Silenced Nineteenth-Century English Society 
Hazlitt describes three different groups who comprised the public, the first of which 
was silenced by the threat of being ostracized by society and who pretended to agree with 
public opinion. He labeled them, “[T]he candid and well-disposed,” and describes them as 
knowing the misinformation was wrong, yet still voicing agreement with it publicly 
(William Hazlitt Selected Writings 145). The name Hazlitt bestowed upon them illustrates 
their role in the public, since “candid” means speaking honestly, which they pretended to 
do when they publicly agreed with the misinformation. Also, “well-disposed” means to be 
agreeable, which they were perceived as by others since they publicly agreed with public 
opinion, despite their private beliefs. However, their public silence about their real beliefs 
enabled the circulation of misinformation and this thesis will discuss the reasons for and 
the consequences of their silence. Since they were silenced by fear and did not speak the 
truth publicly, I will refer to them as the silenced group.  
Another group within the public were those who found rumors to be exciting and 
sought to hear all rumors, without any discrimination against fact or fiction. Hazlitt named 
them, “the malicious and idle” and describes them as people “who…[were] eager to believe 
all the ill they can hear of everyone” (145-6). They were so ravenous for gossip that they 
did not discriminate between who they would or would not believe rumors about, as they 
looked for gossip about the entire public. Additionally, they did not discriminate between 
rumors based on validity, as they listened for all of the rumors in circulation. Hazlitt 
highlights a correlation between being “malicious and idle,” or having cruel intentions and 
being lazy or bored since they very much wanted to believe rumors, which served as a 
distraction from monotony. This thesis will also address Hazlitt’s belief that, for the public, 
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rumors served to stave off boredom, and the effect he believed this had on creating an 
unnatural public, which ultimately helped those in power to be able to manipulate the 
public. I will refer to them as the non-discriminating group since they would believe 
anything, about anyone.  
The final group determined the validity of rumors based on if they supported their 
beliefs, instead of fact. Hazlitt labeled them, “the prejudiced and interested” and describes 
them as those “who…[were] determined to credit all the ill they hear against those who are 
not of their own side” (146). Their name also describes their role within the public since 
“prejudiced” means biased and “interested” means invested, implying they cared and were 
“interested” in rumors, but this “interest” was simultaneously skewed by a bias, which they 
used rumors to confirm. I will refer to them as the intolerant group as they were unable to 
tolerate uncertainty and because they were unable to tolerate evidence that proved their 
beliefs wrong. Both of these attributes in “On Public Opinion” perpetuated the circulation of 





Section II: The Intolerant Group & Imposing Silence to Prevent Uncertainty 
Hazlitt argues that the intolerant group avoided uncertainty by stubbornly refusing 
to consider any information that would have caused them to question their beliefs. He 
asserts that:  
“[I]t is only requisite to be understood that the butt of ridicule or slander is of 
an opposite party [than the intolerant group], and they presently give you 
carte blanche to say what you please of him. Do they know that it is true? No; 
but they believe what all the world says, till they have evidence to the 
contrary. Do you prove that it is false? They dare say, that if not, that 
something worse remains behind; and they retain the same opinion as 
before, for the honour of their party” (William Hazlitt Selected Writings 146).  
 
Hazlitt illustrates that even certain, infallible proof did not inspire thinking and instead the 
intolerant group ignorantly clung to their beliefs. They claimed that another scandal 
existed, subsequently justifying their beliefs and calming any uncertainties—especially 
since the other scandal was supposedly more corrupt than the original, which had been 
proven to be a lie. Hazlitt lambasts them for needing their beliefs confirmed and for being 
unable to stomach the uncertainty that could arise from questioning one’s beliefs and even 
states that they had gall to deny proof.  
Hazlitt uses the intolerant group’s irrational dedication to Mr. Blackwood to 
illustrate that not even evidence they personally experienced would provoke questioning 
of their beliefs and that this inability to question allowed public opinion to dictate their 
beliefs. He argues that, “The gentleman would be obliged to disbelieve his senses rather 
than give Mr. Blackwood the lie, who is read and believed by the whole world” (William 
Hazlitt Selected Writings 147-8). Hazlitt disgustedly states that a member of the intolerant 
group would mistrust evidence they personally experienced instead of believing that Mr. 
Blackwood was wrong and instead of questioning their beliefs. Hazlitt illustrates that this 
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inability to question and tolerate uncertainty was the reason for their conformity and 
agreement with public opinion since nothing would change or challenge their beliefs—not 
even their own experience. This subsequently allowed the intolerant group to be 
completely controlled by public opinion, which, as Hazlitt has made abundantly clear, was 
often wrong. 
Hazlitt argues that the public in nineteenth-century England not only refused to 
question their beliefs, but contrary information was so threatening that they became 
irrationally angry when evidence contested their views and refused to admit they could be 
wrong. He writes that, “Instead of apologizing for the mistake, and, from finding one 
aspersion false, doubting all the rest, they are only more confirmed in the remainder from 
being deprived of one handle against you, and resent their disappointment, instead of being 
ashamed of their credulity” (William Hazlitt Selected Writings 146). It is explicitly clear that 
the intolerant group reacted inconsistently with what would have been expected in polite 
society, since instead of asking for forgiveness, the intolerant group would become angry. It 
is noteworthy that Hazlitt used “apologizing” as it implies self-reflection and 
acknowledgment of wrongdoing and by stating that they were incapable of “apologizing,” 
he implies they were incapable of self-reflection and challenging their beliefs. He further 
illustrates this by stating that instead of feeling embarrassed for having been so gullible, 
they were furious at having been made to momentarily feel uncertain. Hazlitt’s word choice 
demonstrates that the intolerant group interpreted contrary information as so threatening 
that it “deprived” or removed their essential needs, in this case the comfort of confirmed 
beliefs. By representing this group as irreconcilable with what would be expected, 
especially given nineteenth-century English society’s insistence on proper behavior, it is 
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evident that the environment described by Hazlitt was not natural nor logical. This 
supports his assertion that false information could easily spread, especially since the 
environment was already not conducive to reality or logic.    
In An Essay on the Principals of Human Action: Being an Argument in Favor of the 
Natural Disinterestedness of the Human Mind (1805), William Hazlitt contends that each 
person has a core, stable sense of self, which should have allowed the intolerant group to be 
able to tolerate uncertainty. Hazlitt does concede that parts of the self do change over time, 
however this core sense of self does not—otherwise one would be a different person each 
time they awoke from sleep. Hazlitt writes that: 
He is the same conscious being now that he will be in the next moment, or 
the next hour, or a month or a year hence. His interests as an individual as 
well as his being must therefore be the same. At least this must be the case as 
long as he retains the consciousness of his past impressions connecting them 
together in one uniform or regular train of feeling: for the interruption of this 
sense of continued identity by sleep, inattention or otherwise seems from it’s 
being afterwards renewed to prove the point more clearly, as it seems to 
shew that there is some deep inward principle which remains the same in 
spite of all particular accidental changes. (An Essay on the Principals of 
Human Action 83) 
 
Thus, while the intolerant group questioning their beliefs could have caused parts of their 
self to change, their core sense of self would have remained certain and stable. This means 
that there was no logical reason for why the intolerant group could not stomach feeling 
uncertain about their beliefs. By depicting this group as irrational and without a stable 
sense of self that would have allowed them to tolerate uncertainty, Hazlitt demonstrates 
the pervasiveness of the unnatural and problematic social environment. He even implies 
that the intolerant group was not grounded in reality since they needed their beliefs 




Section III: The Silenced Group & Fear of Ostracization 
 
Part A: The Creation of Fear of Ostracization & Silencing 
Hazlitt asserts that the victim of a rumor was ostracized by their friends who did so 
in order to protect their own reputation. He states that, “Our friends, indeed, are more apt 
than a mere stranger to join in with, or be silent under, any imputation thrown out against 
us, because they are apprehensive they may be indirectly implicated in it, and they are 
bound to betray us to save their own credit” (William Hazlitt Selected Writings 142). Hazlitt 
illustrates that fear of having their reputation tarnished through guilt by association was 
the reason why victims of a rumor were deserted by everyone in their lives, including those 
closest to them. It is noteworthy that the concern for those closest to the victim of a rumor 
was specifically to protect their name or “credit,” as that insinuates that one’s reputation 
was extremely valued at that time—it was valued even more highly than close 
relationships with others. This is further confirmed since those closest to the victim of a 
rumor were the most likely to denounce the victim. Given that a reputation was so 
extremely valued, the threat of it being ruined by becoming the victim of a rumor or being 
associated with the victim of a rumor was even more pronounced.  
Hazlitt consents that the public in the nineteenth century had a good reason for 
ostracizing the victim at the epicenter of a scandal, since it was unjustifiable to defend the 
improper behavior of others. He argues that, “People will not fail to observe, that a man 
may have his reasons for his faults or vices; but that for another to volunteer a defense of 
them, is without excuse” (William Hazlitt Selected Writings 143). Hazlitt claims that the 
public could occasionally acknowledge that there were causes for the victim of a rumor’s 
supposed scandalous behavior, yet nineteenth-century English society believed that it was 
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not acceptable for others to attempt to justify the behavior. The fear of becoming a public 
scandal was fueled by the possibility of being perceived as worse than the victim for 
attempting to vindicate the victim, especially since the punishment was being disavowed 
and ostracized by the entire public. 
Hazlitt explains that public opinion was volatile and randomly moved from person 
to person, which made it possible for anyone to become the next victim of it and 
ostracization. He claims that, “It [public opinion] is like the wind, that ‘no man knoweth 
whence it cometh, or whither it goeth’” (William Hazlitt Selected Writings 144). Hazlitt’s 
reference to the line from John 3:8 about the “wind” illustrates the infeasibility of knowing 
when public opinion would shift focus onto a new victim (William Hazlitt Selected Writings 
385). Comparing public opinion to the “wind,” demonstrates the utter unpredictability and 
uncontrollability of public opinion in nineteenth-century England as the “wind” can shift 
direction, appear, or disappear without notice. Hazlitt explains that this unpredictability 
created a social environment riddled with fear, since it was impossible to know who would 
be the next victim of a rumor and the subsequent ostracism. The unpredictably was also 
what made one afraid to defend a friend, as public opinion could suddenly shift to the 
defender without any warning, especially since, as he argues, the public found it 
inexcusable to defend another person’s flaws.  
Hazlitt alleges that rumors were amoral as they were not created accidentally and 
were not circulated because they were valid, but instead because many were outraged by 
them, which made it possible for anyone to be illogically ostracized. He asserts that, “[T]he 
universality of the outcry is often the only ground of the opinion; and that it is purposely 
raised upon this principle, that all other proof or evidence against the person meant to be 
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run down is wanting” (William Hazlitt Selected Writings 144). Hazlitt is explicit that truth 
was not an important aspect of rumors since he used “opinion,” which means that 
subjectivity was privileged over fact. This is further confirmed since how angrily the public 
reacted to the rumor determined how frequently it was repeated, not truth. Hazlitt’s use of 
“principle” implies morality was considered when rumors were circulated, however he is 
explicit that morality was not a component since validity was not important. He further 
denotes that rumors were immoral by using “principles” sarcastically which implies that 
rumors were spread maliciously and were not lacking truth accidentally. Hazlitt conveys 
that this disregard for truth when circulating rumors at that time intensified the fear of 
becoming the subject of one, since anyone could be accused of anything and be ostracized. 
Hazlitt maintains that the silenced group in nineteenth-century England was bound 
by societal norms which enabled the circulation of misinformation, since disobeying those 
norms could result in ostracization. He writes that, “[E]veryone in such circumstances [the 
social environment] keeps his own opinion to himself, and only attends to or acts upon that 
which he conceives to be the opinion of everyone but himself” (William Hazlitt Selected 
Writings 145). Privately the silenced group had beliefs that were different from what they 
stated publicly. Hazlitt stresses that the belief was “his” or the individual’s and not the 
public’s, emphasizing that there was a difference between privately and publicly stated 
beliefs. Hazlitt explains that the pressure to adhere to societal norms dictated the publicly 
voiced beliefs since the only ones expressed were those which supposedly the rest of the 
public held as well. While conforming to society in the nineteenth century would prevent 
ostracization, it also facilitated the circulation of misinformation since no one countered 
the public beliefs out of fear. Hazlitt writes that, “[O]ne man takes up what he believes 
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another will think and which the latter professes only because he believes it held by the 
first!” (William Hazlitt Selected Writings 145). The silenced group repeated what they 
imagined the public thought, indicating it was dangerous to go against public opinion. The 
problematic circular thinking described by Hazlitt, where each person repeated public 
opinion because it was what they assumed the other thought and then the other repeated it 
as well for the same reasons, required being able to imagine what the other person was 
thinking.  
Hazlitt argues that not only was the imagination used to conceive what another 
believed in order to be able to voice that publicly, but it was also used to comprehend how 
heinous the experience of those who were ostracized was, which subsequently generated 
the silenced group’s fear of ostracization. He writes that:  
There is no communication between my nerves, and another’s brain, by 
means of which he can be affected with my sensations as I am myself. The 
only notice or perception which another can have of this sensation in me or 
which I can have of a similar sensation in another is by means of the 
imagination. (An Essay on the Principals of Human Action 111)  
 
The silenced group watched the victim of a rumor endure humiliation and betrayal by 
friends and then imagined how they would feel under those same circumstances (William 
Hazlitt Selected Writings 146). Upon imagining the feelings they personally would 
experience, the silenced group made every effort to avoid being the victim of a rumor in the 
future. Hazlitt contends that: 
The true impulse to voluntary action can only exist in the mind of a being 
capable of foreseeing the consequences of things, of being interested in them 
from the imaginary impression thus made upon his mind, and of making 
choice of the means necessary to produce, or prevent what he desires or 




People care about the outcomes for the future self and this affects decisions in the moment. 
The silenced group was motivated to monitor their public statements in order to protect 
their future self, especially from ostracization and ridicule. Thus, while the silenced group 
was aware that the beliefs of others were false, they still repeated those publicly in order to 




Section III: The Silenced Group & Fear of Ostracization 
 
Part B: The Imagination, Fear of Ostracization & Silencing 
Using one’s imagination in order to identify with others was not a new concept. The 
Scottish Enlightenment philosophers in the eighteenth century described sympathy as 
requiring imagination and their writing both proceeded and influenced Hazlitt as a 
Romantic writer in the nineteenth century. Adam Smith’s The Theory of Moral Sentiments 
(1759) focuses on the development of sympathy and provides the definition for the 
concept of “sympathetic identification.” He argues that sympathy is developed by one 
imagining removing themselves from their body, placing themselves in the other’s 
situation, imagining how they would feel in that situation, and then internalizing those 
feelings. When explaining the process, Smith asserts that, “His agonies, when they are thus 
brought home to ourselves, when we have thus adopted and made them our own, begin at 
last to affect us, and we then tremble and shudder at the thought of what he feels” (9). 
According to Smith, the imagination allowed the listener to place themselves in the other’s 
situation and then transport those feelings back to the self and internalize them. He 
emphasizes this with “brought,” “adopted,” and “own,” since those denote that the listener 
was translating the experience of the person sharing back on to the self so that the listener 
could understand or at least attempt to understand the feelings of the person sharing.  
While both Hazlitt and Smith agree that using the imagination can create sympathy 
for others, Hazlitt also argues in An Essay on the Principals of Human Action (1805) that the 
imagination allows one to relate to their future self. He asserts that:  
If I wish to anticipate my own future feelings, whatever these may be, I must 
do so by means of the same faculty [imagination], by which I conceive of 
those of others whether past or future. I have no distinct or separate faculty 
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on which the events and feelings of my future being are impressed 
beforehand, and which shews as in an inchanted mirror to me and me alone 
the reversed picture of my future life. (An Essay on the Principals of Human 
Action 113) 
 
While Smith’s “sympathetic identification” prescribes how to sympathize with another 
person, Hazlitt’s expansion on this idea to include identifying with the future self explains 
an essential aspect of human behavior and what motivates action in the present. Fear 
becomes a decisive factor in the present to prevent an undesirable future, such as the 
victim of a rumor’s future.  
Hazlitt explains that fear of ostracization motivated the silenced group to repeat the 
majority opinion despite not believing or agreeing with it. He writes that, “[O]ur own eyes, 
but must ‘wink and shut our apprehension up’, that we may be able to agree to the report 
of others, as a piece of good manners and point of established etiquette” (William Hazlitt 
Selected Writings 148). The need to silence one’s fears, implies self-regulation or that the 
person was regulating their public vocalizations in accordance with societal norms and 
expectations. This is also supported by “good manners” and “established etiquette,” since 
both mean there was a need to act appropriately and that there was an acute awareness of 
the importance of proper behavior, conducting oneself appropriately and acting in 
harmony with public opinion. While the imagination would allow a member of the public to 
be aware that disagreeing with public opinion could lead to ostracization, this regulation of 
behavior also would have required having learned how to behave in accordance with 
societal norms. 
Ildiko Csengei in Sympathy, Sensibility, and the Literature of Feeling in the Eighteenth 
Century (2012), argues in the eighteenth century fear could be transferred between 
members of the public and Hazlitt expands upon this eighteenth-century idea to contend 
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that fear was always being transferred among the silenced group since their imagination 
was continuously identifying with the victim of a rumor. Csengei asserts that:  
[S]ympathy is not simply a form of sentiment that holds communities 
together. It is also a kind of sentiment that travels quickly from person to 
person—a concept that makes frequent appearance in a variety of discourses 
throughout the period. ‘Dangerous’ passions, such as enthusiasm, are 
described in these terms, but so are other-regarding sentiments, like 
sympathy. (40) 
  
Csengei maintains that emotions could be transferred between people and used to spark an 
emotional reaction. While this transfer of emotion is crucial to Hazlitt’s argument about 
how fear of ostracization was spread, Hazlitt also maintains that sympathy is continuously 
occurring, which is how the fear was able to permeate nineteenth-century English society. 
Thus, the silenced group was constantly identifying with the victim of a rumor and was 
motivated to avoid the same fate. In “Negative Capability,” (1963) Walter Jackson Bate 
states that:  
In his Principles of Human Action, Hazlitt went much further than Adam 
Smith’s Theory of Moral Sentiments. His hope was to show that imaginative 
sympathy was not a mere escape hatch from the prison of egocentricity, but 
something thoroughgoing, something indigenous and inseparable from all 
activities of the mind. Sympathetic identification takes place constantly—
even if only with ourselves and our own desired future. (24) 
  
The silenced group identified with the victim of a rumor, by imagining how it would feel to 
be the victim, and then was motivated to avoid a similar fate. The fear was always being 
spread among the silenced group, whether they were conscious of it, and was continuously 
inciting the need to behave appropriately and voice agreeable, non-disruptive opinions. 
Witnessing the victim be betrayed by friends, become the subject of ridicule, as well as the 
ease with which rumors shifted focus fueled fear of speaking out against public opinion. 
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Imagining how it would feel to be the victim of a rumor and being motivated to 
avoid that fate, was not enough to prevent one from becoming the victim of a rumor: It was 
also necessary to understand why the victim was targeted and subsequently avoid 
engaging in that behavior. Evelyn Forget in “Evocations of Sympathy: Sympathetic Imagery 
in Eighteenth-Century Social Theory and Physiology,” (2003) claims that sympathy or using 
imagination can be used to exert control over those not in power. She states that, 
“[S]ometimes sympathy is not a symmetric relationship between the minds of two equals 
but suggests rather the influence of those of greater mental powers over weaker 
individuals” (Forget 288). Hazlitt has repeatedly demonstrated that the silenced group was 
silenced by the need to agree with public opinion. As the silenced group had to use their 
imagination to imagine the consequences of disagreeing with public opinion and imagining 
the correct public response that agreed with public opinion—even though the silenced 
group was not conscious of using their imagination—the imagination clearly exerted the 
intolerant group’s beliefs over the silenced group’s. However, Forget does not provide an 
explanation for how the intolerant and non-discriminating groups taught the silenced group 
behavior that was acceptable and how the silenced group could avoid becoming the victim 
of a rumor. Thus it is now necessary to comprehend how societal etiquette was imparted 
and reinforced in order to understand how the intolerant and non-discriminating groups 
were able to maintain their position of power over the silenced group and subsequently 
perpetuate the problematic nineteenth-century English society.  
Smith’s The Theory of Moral Sentiments (1759) clarifies how the imagination taught 
the public to mirror societally acceptable behavior and subsequently became a regulating 
factor for behavior. He asserts that, “We suppose ourselves the spectators of our own 
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behavior, and endeavor to imagine what effect it would, in this light, produce upon us. This 
is the only looking-glass by which we can, in some measure, with the eyes of other people, 
scrutinize the propriety of our own conduct” (Smith 105). In this instance the imagination 
was used to step into the mind of a member of society to reflect on oneself, instead of 
stepping into an injured person’s position to reflect on their experience. Imagining how a 
member of society would judge one’s behavior provided the opportunity to be self-critical 
and understand how the behavior was experienced by others. Smith describes this practice 
further and explains how it was a regulating factor for behavior. He writes that:  
We become anxious to know how far we deserve their censure or applause, 
and whether to them we must necessarily appear…agreeable or 
disagreeable…We begin, upon this account, to examine our own passions and 
conduct, and to consider how these must appear to them, by considering how 
they would appear to us if in their situation. (Smith 105) 
  
The motivation to learn how to behave appropriately was inspired by an individual’s desire 
to be praised instead of reprimanded by society, or those whom the individual has been 
taught to look to for approval. Society, according to Smith, had an explicit influence on 
behavior since individuals were nervous about breaking rules, and were motivated to 
adjust their behavior according to if society praised their behavior or reprimanded it.  
Like Smith, Hazlitt describes the public having learned socially acceptable behavior, 
however he asserts that there were significantly greater consequences for not following 
social etiquette and that these consequences forced compliance with public opinion. Hazlitt 
claims that:  
What then is it that gives it [the rumor] its confident circulation and its 
irresistible force? It is the loudness of the organ with which it is 
pronounced…the number of voices that take it [the rumor] up and repeat it, 
because others have done so…Thus everyone joins in asserting, propagating, 
and in outwardly approving what everyone, in his private and unbiassed 
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judgment, believes and knows to be scandalous and untrue. (William Hazlitt 
Selected Writings 144-5) 
  
While Smith describes society teaching and influencing behavior with verbal 
encouragement or chastisement, Hazlitt describes society as both forcing obedience to an 
unnatural environment and threatening harsher punishments that would completely 
devastate the victim’s life. Depicting the entire public as aggressively stating and spreading 
beliefs implies that there was both a fear of being ostracized and a pressure to conform to 
society since there was an explicitly clear and harsh message about how to behave with 
propriety. Additionally, Hazlitt insinuates that the public would repeat what the rest of the 
public had repeated, simply because that was public opinion, which is an example of both 
pressure in nineteenth-century England to conform to society and the motivation created 
by fear. If there were no consequences for not regurgitating public opinion, there would be 
no need to force it upon others and there would not be such precise recitation of public 
opinion. Hazlitt suggests that there was a difference between what was declared in 
“private” versus in public, by describing “private” statements as factual and public 





Section IV: The Effect of Silence 
It could erroneously seem that if the silenced group were to simply speak the truth, 
the circulation of misinformation would be halted, however in nineteenth-century English 
society only public opinion was audible. Hazlitt states that, “[T]he deafening buzz or 
loosened roar of laughter or of indignation, renders it impossible for the still small voice of 
reason to be heard, and leaves no other course to honesty or prudence than to fall flat on 
the face before it” (William Hazlitt Selected Writings 145). Hazlitt is explicit that the truth 
was too quiet to even be audible and that the loudness of public opinion completely 
silenced it. His use of “small” is noteworthy since it implies the truth was too quiet to be 
heard and that the number of people who vocalized the truth was so “small” or so few in 
number, that it was hardly perceptible. Thus, even if the silenced group were to speak, it 
would not be loud enough to effectively challenge public opinion. Hazlitt also insinuates 
this in other instances, as he claims that only unconventional people publically 
contradicted public opinion (William Hazlitt Selected Writings 144). Thus, the silenced 
group members who attempted to speak would do so in vain, since they would not be able 
to overturn public opinion and instead would only place themselves at risk for being the 
victim of the rumor. Hazlitt also implies that the intolerant and non-discriminating groups 
were not listening to logic or truth since it was inaudible, which supports his previous 
claims that the intolerant and non-discriminating groups wanted public opinion to provide 
comfort and entertainment, not truth. 
For the truth to even be heard, Hazlitt argues that the silenced group would need to 
verbally combat the intolerant and non-discriminating groups in every social interaction. 
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However, this would require the silenced group to not only risk ostracization, but to also go 
against the ingrained societal expectations of acceptable behavior. Hazlitt asserts that:  
[H]ow shall we expect our feeble voices not to be drowned in the general 
clamour?…how shall we animate the great mass of indifference or distrust 
with our private enthusiasm?…It is a thing not to be thought of, unless we 
would enter into a crusade against prejudice and malignity, devote ourselves 
as martyrs to friendship, raise a controversy in every company we go into, 
quarrel with every person we meet, and after making ourselves and 
everyone else uncomfortable, leave off, not by clearing our friend’s 
reputation, but by involving our own pretensions to decency and common 
sense. (William Hazlitt Selected Writings 143) 
  
Hazlitt proves that the intolerant and non-discriminating groups were who would need to 
be combated in each social interaction by using “prejudice and malignity,” since the labels 
he had bestowed upon the intolerant and non-discriminating groups were the “prejudiced 
and interested” and the “malicious and idle,” respectively (William Hazlitt Selected Writings 
146). In order to argue in every social encounter to contest the false public opinion, all 
social pleasantries would need to be discarded by the silenced group and they would need 
to resign themselves to being uneasy in all social interactions as they railed against social 
etiquette in an effort to halt the misinformation. While this would be possible, the 
acquaintance’s name would not be saved and as stated earlier by Hazlitt, the truth would 
always be silenced by public opinion, rendering this a fruitless and exhausting endeavor 
(William Hazlitt Selected Writings 145). Given the hopelessness of the task, Hazlitt does 
defend the silenced group for not speaking, however he does still subtly suggest that they 
were not free of blame for the problematic social environment—they abandoned and 
betrayed acquaintances in the midst of scandal to protect themselves and tacitly allowed 
misinformation to circulate. Hazlitt views all as responsible for the environment and is 
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sympathetic to the position of each group, while simultaneously holding them accountable 
(Gilmartin 96). 
Csengei explains that the eighteenth-century rules for proper behavior were so 
deeply ingrained and enforced that the silenced group would feel intense embarrassment 
for knowingly breaking the rules. He asserts that, “[O]ne can blush for the rudeness and 
imprudence of someone who has no sense of the impropriety of his behaviour” (Csengei 
59). All involved in a combative interaction would feel extreme discomfort, especially the 
silenced group since they knowingly disregarded social etiquette. Csengei goes on to 
explain why the public would react so negatively to the silenced group and why the silenced 
group would feel so hesitant to speak. He writes that, “[t]he so-called ‘unsocial passions’—
such as hatred, anger and resentment—do not carry the benefit of any pleasurable bodily 
sensation, and affect the onlooker with feelings of dissonance, cacophony and disagreeable 
bodily sensations” (Csengei 55). Going against ineradicable societal norms would be 
uncomfortable for all involved however the silenced group would feel the consequences of 
the action most deeply. They would be the ones met with extremely negative reactions—
both because they would be breaking the etiquette of being agreeable and would feel the 
embarrassment of that and because they would cause the intolerant group to feel 
momentarily uncertain and would face that subsequent wrath. While the intolerant group 
would quickly be able to reinforce their old beliefs, the silenced group member would be at 
risk for becoming the victim of a rumor and having their life destroyed (William Hazlitt 





Section V: The Unnatural Public & The Silencing Effect 
Hazlitt contends that any information capable of creating feelings of uncertainty for 
the intolerant group would never be allowed to be broadcast in a manner that could 
effectively counter public opinion. He writes that: 
All therefore that is necessary, to control public opinion is, to gain possession 
of some organ loud and lofty enough to make yourself heard, that has power 
and interest on its side; and then, no sooner do you blow a blast in this trump 
of ill-fame, like the horn hung up by an old castle-wall, then you are 
answered, echoed, and accredited on all sides: the gates are thrown open to 
receive you, and you are admitted into the very heart of the fortress of public 
opinion, and can assail from the ramparts with every engine of abuse, and 
with privileged impunity, all those who may come forward to vindicate the 
truth, or to rescue their good name from the unprincipled keeping of 
authority, servility, sophistry and venal falsehood! (William Hazlitt Selected 
Writings 145) 
 
Altering public opinion required support of the intolerant and non-discriminating groups, 
who dictated it at the time, however the intolerant group would never allow public opinion 
to disperse any information that would cause them to question their beliefs. Since the 
intolerant group also had the ability to safely attack anyone who spoke against public 
opinion, if the silenced group were to speak, they would immediately be re-silenced and 
potentially be made the subject of a rumor and ostracized. The static and immutable nature 
of public opinion in nineteenth-century England enabled a social environment where fact 
and fiction became interchangeable. While this benefited some, it allowed misinformation 
to circulate freely and unchallenged.  
Hazlitt argues that given the powerlessness of the silenced group, any member who 
wanted to counter the false information would have had to have been an unconventional 
person, like him, who was not deterred by the pressure to conform to societal expectations. 
He writes that: 
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[H]e who is proof against it [misinformation], must either be armed with a 
love of truth, or contempt for mankind, which place him out of the reach of 
ordinary rules and calculations. For myself, I do not shrink from defending a 
cause or a friend under a cloud; though in neither case will cheap or common 
efforts suffice. (William Hazlitt Selected Writings 144) 
  
The person who chose to combat the misinformation would have to go to war against 
public opinion and risk being ostracized and losing their reputation because they cared 
more about verity than social convention. Or they would have to be someone who had little 
regard for what those in nineteenth-century English society thought of them and this 
convention had to be strong enough to overcome any hesitancy about breaking social 
convention. Referring to himself perfectly illustrates his argument since Hazlitt was the 
victim of rumors over the course of his lifetime and was most definitely ostracized by 
society—also, his ability to see the complex dynamics between each societal group and 
hold all accountable, marked him as a unique person. His use of “ordinary” is noteworthy 
since it should not have required an unconventional person to counter the circulation of 
misinformation. That should have been a joint effort made by all of the public, yet it 
explicitly was not, illustrating that nineteenth-century English society was decidedly 
unnatural.  
Smith offers an explanation for why the silenced group would remain silent and also 
why someone would choose to take the stance that Hazlitt did. Smith writes that:  
Man naturally desires, not only to be loved, but to be lovely; or to be that 
thing which is the natural and proper object of love. He naturally dreads, not 
only to be hated, but to be hateful; or to be that thing which is the natural and 
proper object of hatred. He desires, not only praise, but praiseworthiness; or 
to be that thing which, though it should be praised by nobody, is however, 
the natural and proper object of praise. (107)  
 
Thus, not only was the silenced group motivated not to become the victim of a rumor in 
order to protect their future selves, but they also had an innate desire to be approved of by 
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society and an aversion to being extremely disliked, which arguably the victim of a rumor 
was or at least felt (An Essay on the Principals of Human Action 22-3). Also, since the 
nineteenth-century English social environment described by Hazlitt made it seem 
impossible to sway public opinion, it is understandable why many would choose not to 
pursue a fruitless, thankless venture which could lead to one losing their reputation and 
being ostracized. However, Smith does also offer an explanation for why Hazlitt would 
choose to speak out against public opinion, despite the consequences: Hazlitt wanted to be 
deserving of esteem, even if no one else deemed him so. Hazlitt was very much not 
esteemed for asserting the truth in the face of public lies, and instead he was ridiculed and 
ostracized (Smith 107, William Hazlitt Selected Writings 146). However, Hazlitt’s aspiration 
to be worthy of admiration, even if it were not bestowed, motivated him to take a stance 
against public opinion instead of remaining silent. Hazlitt believed that the silenced group 
in nineteenth-century English society had to make a choice between two instinctive human 
motivations—to be liked by one’s fellows or to be worthy of esteem. Being forced to choose 
between two innate human needs insinuates that the social environment described by 
Hazlitt was not “natural” and was counter to reason, as has been Hazlitt’s argument.   
Hazlitt contends that not only were the rumors and opinions that were circulated 
false, but also all information circulating in the nineteenth-century English environment 
was altered and adjusted to fit the intolerant group’s biased narrative that prevented 
uncertainty. He asserts that, “It is not a single breath of rumour or opinion; but the whole 
atmosphere is infected with a sort of agueish taint of anger and suspicion, that relaxes the 
nerves of fidelity, and makes our most sanguine resolutions sicken and turn pale” (William 
Hazlitt Selected Writings 144). Hazlitt is explicit that not just rumors were falsely 
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circulated, but all information was subjected to alteration dependent on the intolerant 
group’s beliefs. By using terms which denote illness, such as “infected,” “sicken,” “agueish,” 
and “pale” to describe nineteenth-century English society, he illustrates that altering 
information in order to make it fit the comfort of the intolerant group made the information 
toxic or “infected,” and consequently this toxicity spread into the rest of society and 
information. Hazlitt’s imagery and word use illustrates that the misinformation and the 
fear of ostracization permeated every aspect of nineteenth-century English societal beliefs 
and it could not have been avoided any more easily than the air that was breathed, since 
“the whole atmosphere is infected.” The intolerant group’s tyrannical control of public 
opinion completely silenced the silenced group since even their most determined 
resolutions to counter public opinion were defeated and deserted by the circulation of 
misinformation. By depicting the entire nineteenth-century English social environment as 
contaminated by misinformation, Hazlitt again insinuates that an erroneous public opinion 
completely dictating the social environment was counter to nature and logic.   
Hazlitt maintains that the circulation of misinformation, altered for the benefit and 
comfort of the intolerant group, not only silenced the silenced group, but also muddled the 
intolerant group’s judgment and rendered them incapable of forming beliefs from their 
personal experiences. He states that, “Seeing is believing, it is said. Lying is believing, say I. 
We do not even see with our own eyes” (William Hazlitt Selected Writings 148). Hazlitt 
implies that the public no longer relied on their personal beliefs, experiences, or thoughts 
for information, only public opinion, which meant that there was no thinking involved, just 
compliance with public opinion. There are two different meanings which can be derived 
from the statement that “[l]ying is believing:” It can mean that one was “lying” to 
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themselves and therefore “believing,” or it can also mean that one believed a falsity, both of 
which the intolerant group was guilty of since they blindly and unquestioningly agreed with 
public opinion. Additionally, thinking is different than knowing and it was extremely easy 
to have a belief that was not true, especially if there was no thinking involved, as was the 
case for the intolerant group. As Hazlitt has argued and illustrated, not thinking for oneself 
was illogical and concerning as it allowed one’s beliefs to be completely prescribed by 
public opinion since there was no contemplation of if those thoughts were correct as there 












Section VI: The Manipulation & Silencing of the Public 
Hazlitt argues that the circulation of misinformation not only prevented any 
uncertainty for the intolerant group, but also fulfilled the non-discriminating group’s need 
for entertainment. He writes that: 
[A] dozen or score of my countrymen, with their faces fixed, and their eyes 
glued to a newspaper, a magazine, a review—reading, swallowing, 
profoundly ruminating on the lie, the cant, the sophism of the day! Why? It 
saves them the trouble of thinking; it gratifies their ill-humour, and keeps off 
the ennui! Does any gleam of doubt, an air of ridicule or a glance of 
impatience pass across their features at the shallow and monstrous things 
they find? No, it is all the passive faith and dull security; they cannot take 
their eyes from the page, they cannot live without it. (William Hazlitt Selected 
Writings 146-7) 
  
Although “reading” is typically associated with digesting and processing information, 
Hazlitt proves that there was no thought process occurring since “swallowing,” implies 
simply taking something in without chewing it or thinking about it and actually digesting it. 
This also insinuates that reading with the intention of confirming beliefs was problematic 
since it was then possible to fool oneself into thinking that one was reading and therefore 
questioning, when one was in fact not. Hazlitt illustrates that there was no thinking 
involved, which would have been expected if they were processing the information, 
especially since Hazlitt states that the information was shocking enough that it should have 
provoked some sort of reaction. It is explicitly clear that this misinformation played a 
specific and important role in the nineteenth-century English society where it served as 
entertainment for the non-discriminating group—explaining why they would want the 
social environment to persist. Additionally, the intolerant group found it pleasurable to take  
in information that confirmed their beliefs since there was no need for uncertainty and 
because it was also entertaining.  
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Hazlitt explains that defending the victim of a rumor or any attempt to halt 
misinformation was interpreted as a personal attack to remove the entertainment from the 
lives of the intolerant and non-discriminating groups. He writes that, “It [defending the 
victim of a rumor] is, in fact, an attempt to deprive them [the public] of the great and only 
benefit they derive from the supposed errors of their neighbours and contemporaries—the 
pleasure of backbiting and railing at them, which they call seeing justice done” (William 
Hazlitt Selected Writings 143-4). Hazlitt insinuates that the item being taken away from the 
intolerant and non-discriminating groups was something completely vital, like food or 
water, with his use of “deprive.” However, only the chance to revel in someone else’s 
misery was being taken away and since their enjoyment came from other’s suffering, 
Hazlitt insinuates both a sick sadism and that this was an essential source of their 
amusement and entertainment.  
Hazlitt maintains that not only was the circulation of misinformation useful to the 
intolerant and non-discriminating groups to stave off uncertainty and boredom, but it was 
also useful to those who had power and could use public opinion to help maintain that 
power. He states that:  
[I]t [rumors] gave him a personal advantage over one he did not like—and 
who will give up what tends to strengthen his aversion against another? To 
Tory prejudice, sore as it is—to English imagination, morbid as it is, a 
nickname, a ludicrous epithet, a malignant falsehood (when it has once been 
propagated and taken to bosoms as a welcome consolation) becomes a 
precious property, a vested right; and people would as soon give up a 
sinecure. (William Hazlitt Selected Writings 148) 
  
Hazlitt insinuates that this environment benefited a select few individuals, such as those in 
power. It is noteworthy that he uses “personal advantage,” as this implies that some were 
able to manipulate public opinion in order to benefit specifically themselves, not 
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nineteenth-century English society. Hazlitt illustrates that public opinion helped destroy 
anyone who disagreed or impeded the personal agenda of someone in power, indicating 
that it was a useful political maneuver that could be used to permanently damage a 
person’s name and credibility and subsequently silence them. Hazlitt confirms that rumors 
were used politically by mentioning “Tory,” which, according to the Oxford English 
Dictionary, was the conservative English party who supported “upholding the constituted 
authority and order in Church and State” and was against “concessions in the direction of 
greater religious liberty” (“Tory, n. and adj.” 3.a.). While rumors did not always proliferate 
into those which had the ability to ruin someone’s name completely and permanently, 
when they did, those rumors were extremely valuable for destroying a political opponent. 
Hazlitt compares public opinion to the wind, so while a rumor could be started, there was 
relatively little control over where it went from there, explaining why rumors did not 
always completely ruin the victim’s life (William Hazlitt Selected Writings 144). Instead, 
rumors could cause varying degrees of embarrassment or loss of reputation as opposed to 
complete ostracization. Since rumors were used politically to destroy a dissenter from 
public opinion, the rumors that did successfully destroy someone were considered the 











Hazlitt proves that the silencing effect perpetuated by the intolerant group’s inability 
to tolerate uncertainty, allowed misinformation to circulate freely in nineteenth-century 
English society. His example of Mr. Blackwood’s followers disbelieving their own 
experiences in order to maintain their beliefs, depicts an uncanny inability to question, 
think about, or even process information (William Hazlitt Selected Writings 147-8). Hazlitt’s 
argument in An Essay on the Principles of Human Action illustrates how irrational the 
intolerant group’s inability to tolerate uncertainty was, as there is a stable, core sense of 
self—otherwise each time a person awoke they would be an entirely new person (83). Yet 
the allure of the entertainment, pleasure, and comfort the intolerant group derived from 
confirming and not questioning their beliefs led to a tyrannical silencing of anyone who 
attempted to challenge those beliefs, which made them highly susceptible to disbelieving 
fact (William Hazlitt Selected Writings 146-7).  
The consequences of ostracism were so costly that the silenced group knowingly 
enabled the circulation of misinformation by publicly repeating the erroneous public 
opinion, despite not agreeing with or believing it (William Hazlitt Selected Writings 145). 
This threat of ostracism also forced the silenced group to choose between the natural want 
to be worthy of respect and to be liked (Smith 107). In nineteenth-century England, it was 
impossible to fulfill both innate desires since being worthy of esteem would require 
publicly contradicting public opinion and being liked would require publicly remaining 
silent. Thus, while Hazlitt chose to be honorable by speaking against the tyranny of the 
intolerant group, he also chose the far less appealing option of being ostracized, ridiculed, 
and ruined (William Hazlitt Selected Writings 146). The silenced group, with no good option 
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available, chose to protect their future selves, which Hazlitt argues influences behavior in 
the present (An Essay on the Principles of Human Action 22-3). Those with power in 
nineteenth-century England chose to not only protect their future selves, but to also benefit 
their future selves, by manipulating public opinion in order to maintain their power. The 
allure of the power available to those who had the ability to control and profit from the 
nearly always erroneous public opinion was too tempting to resist (William Hazlitt Selected 
Writings 148). 
At the beginning of the Scottish Enlightenment in the eighteenth century, in An Essay 
on the Nature and Conduct of the Passions and Affections with Illustrations upon the Moral 
Sense (1728), Francis Hutcheson anticipated the problematic social environment Hazlitt 
describes in nineteenth-century England by cautioning that beauty can conceal truth. 
Hutcheson states that in society there, “must be Conformity to Reason: Truth discovered by 
our Reason is certain and invariable: That then alone is the Original Idea of Virtue, 
Agreement with Reason. But in like manner our Sight and Sense of Beauty is deceitful, and 
does not always represent the true Forms of Objects” (230-1). The society described by 
Hazlitt was completely deceived by more attractive choices—the silenced group found the 
option of protecting their future selves more appealing, the intolerant group found the 
pleasure of their certainty more appealing than questioning or thinking, and those in power 
found their power more appealing than being moral. Hazlitt has repeatedly demonstrated 
how the social environment was counter to human nature or “[r]eason,” since 
misinformation circulated, people were silenced, and innate human drives were repressed. 
Additionally, the intolerant group dictating what information circulated in the nineteenth-
century English social environment according to whether or not it confirmed their beliefs 
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and not fact was counter to rationality. Silencing the silenced group when they attempted to 
speak reason with threats of ostracization, depicted a society that was severely lacking in 
integrity. Additionally, those who controlled public opinion used it to their advantage to 
keep power, confirm beliefs, and for entertainment, which were clearly not virtuous 
reasons to manipulate public opinion. Furthermore, those who immorally used public 
opinion for their own gain were respected, while those who attempted to be honorable 
were silenced or mocked. Hazlitt himself acknowledges the ridicule, slander, and public 
embarrassment he endured as the victim of rumors (William Hazlitt Selected Writings 146). 
As Hutcheson had warned in 1728, the nineteenth-century social environment described 
by Hazlitt had lost the ability to be rational and the cost was an unnatural society where a 
public opinion not based on fact was able to circulate. 
Hazlitt argues that appealing options misled the entire public, although some groups 
had access to far more attractive options than others. This deception was ultimately 
detrimental to nineteenth-century English society as misinformation was able to circulate 
and the resulting social environment was counter to human nature. Hazlitt illustrates how 
each group interacted with the others to result in the problematic social environment. He 
simultaneously holds the silenced group accountable for remaining silent, yet acknowledges 
that their other option was to risk losing the favor of public opinion and to potentially lose 
their reputation, friends, and community. While Hazlitt does lambaste the intolerant group 
for needing gossip to allay their boredom, he also acknowledges that there was comfort 
and pleasure, albeit a sick one, in denying the truth and blindly accepting public opinion.  
Hazlitt even acknowledges that most in a position of power would use it to manipulate 
public opinion to maintain that power.  
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Hazlitt’s ability in “On Public Opinion” to hold all accountable and demonstrate each 
group's contribution to nineteenth-century English society, depicts the complex 
entanglement of the groups and illustrates why it was able to persist. He also proves that 
this social environment was ironic as the natural inclinations of humans were exploited to 
create an unnatural society. The desire to be loved by others, praised by others, not be 
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